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Two Traditional Indian Models for 
Interreligious Dialogue: 
Monistic Accommodationism and 
Flexible Fundamentalism 
by Christopher Chappie 
/I Ν THE YOGAVASISTHA, A SYNCRETIC Hindu text of the 
L/ | tenth or twelfth century, an attempt is made to harmonize 
C-x the absolute truth as articulated in a number of competing 
systems, including various forms of Buddhism, Vedanta, and 
Samkhya. This approach, which I call monistic accommodationism, 
stems from a Buddhist-influenced, highly idealized form of Advaita 
Vedanta. 
From its beginnings, Jainism has been concerned with under­
standing, respecting, and countering competing religious views. 
Although acknowledging various forms of Hinduism and Buddhism 
as offering partial truths, Jainism exhibits what I call flexible funda­
mentalism, holding firm to its central teachings of jiva, karma, and 
kevala while exploring other systems. In this paper, these two 
approaches will be compared and contrasted with select modern, 
Western approaches to interreligious dialogue. 
India has given rise to multiple unique theological and philo­
sophical perspectives. In the Vedic hymns and in later popular 
Hinduism, we find a number of distinct gods and goddesses being 
worshipped, in a process dubbed "henotheism" by Max Mueller.1 In 
the Upanishads we find an interiorization of ritual, resulting in an 
identification between the macrocosm {brahman) and the micro­
cosm (atman), the foundation for later Vedan tic monism. However, 
this emphasis on the "not-twoness" of things finds counterbalance in 
the Samkhya and Yoga schools, which posit a twofold reality, with 
one aspect in perpetual change (prakrti) and the other merely look­
ing on (purusa). Later sects elevated one or another deity to nearly 
monotheistic status, as in Vaisnava devotions to Krishna or Rama 
and Saivite allegiance to Siva. All these traditions—henotheistic, 
monistic, psychological/meditative, and devotional—claim a com­
mon heritage in the Vedic texts, though their interpretations 
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diverge widely. Each of these perspectives can be loosely styled as 
"Brahmanical." 
In contrast to the Brahmanical models, two r enounce r or 
Sramanic traditions arose in India offering yet two more philosophi-
cal positions. The Buddhists denied the abiding nature of anything, 
either internal or external, and urged people to exert themselves at 
quelling desire, establishing an anti-deity, anti-metaphysical system. 
The Jainas posited a universe of countless, interchanging life forms 
trapped by the effects of past actions, and proclaimed that the 
release of the human soul is possible through the assiduous obser-
vance of an ethic rooted in non-injury to life. 
Unl ike the p r o p h e t i c mono the i sm that arose from the 
Mediterranean world, where one can speak of a single deity, and a 
similar, if not common, covenant amongst Jews, Christians, and 
Muslims, very little united these conflicting world views. Yet, each of 
these systems, from the henotheistic Hindus to the atheistic Jainas, 
has managed to flourish in India, along with Islam and more recent 
traditions such as Sikhism. What has enabled this coexistence of 
seemingly contradictory systems? What lessons does India offer for 
the process of interreligious dialogue? How might contemporary 
India, currently wracked with divisiveness caused by religious alle-
giances, benefit from an historical reflection on its earlier grappling 
with the issue of plurality? 
To answer some of these questions, I have chosen two texts, one 
from Hinduism and the other from Jainism, that provide models for 
respecting other traditions through reflective understanding. 
The Yogavasistha 
In the period during and immediately following Gupta rule (ca. 
320-500 C.E.), India experienced an explosion of creativity in the 
arts, l i terature, and poetry. The epic tradition had expanded 
beyond the Ramayana and the Mahabharata into the Purans, and 
the various forms of speculative Hinduism mentioned above found 
new articulation and new audiences in the process. The sacred and 
secret Upanishads and Vedas were retold by the sages of these texts, 
and even the arguments raised by the Sramanas entered into the 
discussion. It was within this context tha t the seeds of the 
Yogavasistha were sown, a text that reached immense proportions 
(nearly 30,000 stanzas) and sought to address nearly all the systems 
mentioned above. 
B.L. Atreya argues that the Yogavasistha was written before 
Sankara because it contains "too much Buddhism,"2 and places it in 
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the sixth or early seventh century CE. Dasgupta thinks the author 
was contemporary with Sankara and dates it in the seventh or 
eighth centuries.3 T.G. Mainkar, the most authoritative scholar on 
this topic, claims that the work went through three major phases, 
beginning with a work that was attributed to the sage Vasistha that 
has since been lost, this text was then expanded into a text known 
as the Laghuyogavasistha and finally into the Yogavasistha .4 The first 
phase of the text addresses issues of karma and self-effort previously 
found in the Mahabharata.5 The second phase relies heavily upon 
the Vijnanavada School of Mahayana Buddhism, particularly as 
found in the Lankavatara Sutra.6 The third phase reflects great 
influence from the Saivite Trika school, particularly in its reference 
to the "issuing-forth" (spanda) process of world creation.7 The poet-
ic style and luxuriant descriptions of the Yogavasistha draw from a 
wealth of Buddhist and Hindu images and metaphors. Atreya has 
written that: 
[The author] has imbibed all that was best in Indian thought that 
existed before him—Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina—and speaks from 
his own standpoint....8 
The great Marathis poet Jnanesvara (1275-1296 C.E.) was influ-
enced by the Yogavasistha, making references to the text in both his 
Amrtanubhava and his Jnanesvan. It also proved to be popular in 
Muslim circles as a good text for explaining the essentials of Hindu 
thought; it was abridged and translated into Persian at least nine 
times.9 
Despite his reliance on and inclusion of diverse voices within his 
text, the unknown author of the Yogavasistha established a unique 
hermeneutical position when dealing with the issue of plurality. 
Earlier encounters between divergent schools of thought sought to 
dispute and disprove the assumptions and conclusions of rival 
schools. Sankara sharply criticized Samkhya for positing a multiplici-
ty of consciousness (purusas), holding instead that pure conscious-
ness is by nature single (advaita). Patanjali, in his \foga Sutra, seems 
to attack the Mahayana Buddhist notion that all things are merely 
inventions of the mind. The Buddha and later Buddhists rejected 
the notion that any aspect of self is immortal, opting for a via negati-
va rather than assenting to personalist or essentialist language. The 
Jainas dismiss the Hindus and Buddhists alike as extremists, as we 
will see below. In the seminal texts of each of these traditions, no 
allowance is made for the possibility that truth can reside in any sys-
tem other than the one that it puts forth. 
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In the Yogavasistha , however, we see an exuberant affirmation of 
diversity. Rather t h a n rejecting the B u d d h a as a nihilist or simply 
ignoring him, as is often the case in H i n d u texts, the author of the 
Yogavasistha is quite familiar with the Buddhist emphasis o n renunci­
ation a n d praises Buddha 's accomplishment of this state: 
In that total renunciation does the highest wisdom or self-knowledge 
exist: the utter emptiness of a pot is where precious jewels are stored. 
It is by such total renunciation that the Sakya Muni (Buddha) 
reached that state beyond doubt in which he was firmly established. 
Hence, O King, having abandoned everything, remain in that form 
and in that state in which you find yourself. Abandon even the 
notion Ί have renounced air and remain in a state of supreme 
peace.10 
Siding with what in m o d e r n times are referred to as perennialists, 
the a u t h o r states that all accomplished mystics share the transcen­
d e n t state of consciousness without an object: 
It is a state of bliss that is not its description, which is both the 'is' 
and the 'is not,' both something and non-something, light and dark­
ness. It is full of non-consciousness and (objectless) consciousness. It 
can only be indicated by negation (not this, not this). He became 
that which is beyond description. 
That state is the void, Brahman, consciousness, the Purusa of the 
Sankhya, Isvara of the yogi, Siva, time, Atman or self, non-self and the 
middle, etc., of the mystics holding different views. It is that state 
which is established as the truth by all these scriptural viewpoints, 
that which is all—in that the sage remained firmly established.11 
This n o n d u a l experience is said to include within it all o ther pos­
sible forms of expression. In the following passage, the a u t h o r clear­
ly locates the Yogavasistha within the Upanisadic tradition, quot ing 
the adage "I am the self of all," but t h e n uses language that is dis­
tinctly Buddhist in tone: 
Once the realization that Ί am the self of air has arisen, one does 
not again fall into error or sorrow. It is this self alone which is vari­
ously described as the void, nature, Maya, Brahman, consciousness, 
Siva, Purusa, etc. That alone is ever real; there is nothing else. Resort 
to the understanding of non-duality, for the truth is non-dual; howev­
er, action involves duality and hence functions in apparent duality. 
The reality is neither duality nor unity. When these concepts cease, 
the infinite consciousness alone is realized to be the sole reality.12 
T h o u g h the opening lines of this passage express Advaita Vedantin 
sentiments, the s tatement that "reality is nei ther duality nor unity" is 
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thoroughly Buddhist in character, demonstrating the author's skill 
at synthesizing multiple traditions. Like such Christian thinkers as 
John Hick, the author of the Yogavasistha seeks to establish a single 
transcendent absolute upon which all expressions of truth depend. 
In some instances he refers to this absolute in essentialist terms: 
This is seen as the Purusa of Samkhya philosophers, the Brahman of 
Vedantins, the Vijnaptimatra of the Yogacara Buddhists, and the 
Sunya of the Sunyavadins.13 
In other instances he uses the evasive style of the Madhyamika 
Buddhists to avoid substantialistic truth claims: 
It is neither sentient nor insentient, neither being nor non-being, 
neither ego nor non-ego, neither one nor many.14 
In this formula, similar to those employed by Nagarjuna, no positive 
statement is allowed in regard to the ultimate entity. 
I refer to this particular attempt to deal with multiplicity as monis-
tic accommodationism. On the one hand, the Yogavasistha is com-
mitted to the notion that a single truth undergirds reality, as experi-
enced by all mystics. On the other hand, it is sensitive to the unwill-
ingness of the Buddhist tradition, which it holds in great esteem, to 
characterize this reality. Consequently, it both "co-opts" Buddhism 
by including it in sweeping declarations of parallelism, and upholds 
Buddhism by employing its unique style of evasive language. In a 
sense, the Yogavasistha does not want its cake, but it does eat it any-
way. In order to reconcile the differences in various systems, it blan-
kets them with incipient monism, while adopting non-monistic 
rhetorical devices to explain both mystical experience and the "non-
nature" of the absolute. 
Flexible Fundamentalism in Jainismi Syadvadamanjari 
The Jain tradition holds the practice of non-violence to be the key 
to all spiritual advancement. For Jainas, the personal application of 
non-violence extends to how one forms and holds opinions about 
others who do not share one's own religious convictions. Two 
devices assist in this process: the seven-fold aspect of Jaina logic, and 
Jaina teachings about what are called "partial truths." This latter 
approach will be compared and contrasted with the Yogavasistha9s 
monistic accommodationism and modern models for interreligious 
dialogue. 
The fundamental teachings of Jainism state that the world is 
divided into non-living and living components, that life forms have 
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existed since the beginning of time in myriad forms, and that life 
can be liberated through a fourteen-fold process. These teachings 
have remained unchanged since their inception. In this regard, the 
Jaina tradition may be considered "fundamentalist" in the sense that 
its cosmology and ethics have not been subject to revision. However, 
this fundamentalism is tempered by a fervent concern that the 
points of view held by others not be dismissed but rather that they 
be explored, understood, and then contextualized in the light of 
Jaina doctrine. 
The Jaina concern for understanding the traditions of others rela-
tive to their own is quite ancient. Record of it is found in the earliest 
texts of the Jaina Canon. The Sutrakrta , included in the second sec-
tion of Jaina canonical literature, critiques other systems of Indian 
thought in light of Jainism, specifically those that seem to advocate 
fatalism, e ternal ism, or vacuity. In the fifth century (C.E.) , 
Siddhasena Divakaras' Sanmatisutra investigates various viewpoints 
as being non-valid when asserted in an absolutist manner. In the 
thirteenth century, Mallisena's Syadvadamanjari offers a compre-
hensive critique of non-Jaina philosophical schools and religious 
practices. 
Jain logic regards all statements to be provisional. Any statement 
could possibly be truth (syadvada). In the words of H.R. Kapadia, 
this signifies that "every judgment that we pass in daily life is true 
only in reference to the standpoint occupied and the aspect of the 
object considered."15 In the Jaina system, each truth is a partial one 
(naya) and no one statement can ever account for the totality of 
reality (anekantavada). Kapadia relates this stance to the practice of 
non-violence: 
When this ahimsa is allowed to play its role on an intellectual plane, 
it teaches us to examine and respect the opinions of others as they, 
too, are some of the angles of vision or pathways to reality which is 
many-sided and enable us to realize and practice truth in its entirety. 
This implies that ahimsa—and the Jaina attitude of intellectual ahim-
sa—is the origin of anekantavada. In other words, the Jaina principle 
of 'respect for life' (ahimsa) is the origin of 'respect for the opinions 
of others' ( ametamtavada) .16 
For purposes of illustrating how Jainas have applied this method to 
their approach to other traditions, we will now examine a few key 
passages from the Syadvadamanjari of Mallisena. This text analyzes 
the views of the Vaisesika "atomists," the Nyaya logicians, the 
Purvamimamsa ritualists, the Vedantins, the adherents to the 
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Samkhya system, various schools of Buddhism, and the Lokayata 
materialists. Mallisena's text is ostensibly written as a commentary 
on verses written by his teacher Hemacandra. 
Sections IV through IX of the text critique the Vaisesika system. 
The Vaisesikas are criticized for being inconsistent, on the one hand 
asserting that a lamp is non-eternal while on the other, that space is 
eternal. Within the Jaina system, as we have seen, no such inconsis­
tency is allowed due to the teachings that atoms and space are both 
eternal. Mallisena then explains the Vaisesika doctrine of a world-
creating god, justified by his omnipresence, self-dependence, and 
eternity. The Jainas do not assent to the argument that a thing's 
presence proves that it has been created; the maker of a pot can be 
seen, so why is this creator-god invisible? If he is truly the author of 
scripture, then why would he praise himself therein? Why would he 
compose scriptures that contradict one another on the utility of ani­
mal sacrifice and the necessity of a Brahman to have a son? The 
Jaina position considers the postulate of a creator god to be unten­
able logically and also states that such a notion weakens the per­
ceived efficacy of karma. 
T h e Nyaya logicians are criticized for their vagueness; the 
Purvami mamsa is criticized for its support of sacrificial animal 
slaughter. Vedanta's position on the non-duality of Brahman and the 
non-reality of the world is examined and then attacked on the 
grounds that if the world is not real then how is it that the world is 
seen? O n e is not both a mother and barren."17 Samkhya is criticized 
on four counts: its notion that consciousness can be devoid of 
object; that the buddhi (intellect) could be "non-intelligent," pro­
claiming that Ί am not'; that sky is born from the subtle elements of 
sound; and that the purusa is neither bound nor liberated. From 
the Jaina perspective, each of these is contradictory. 
T h r e e dist inct schools of Buddhism are p r e s e n t e d . T h e 
Madhyamika is dismissed as not adequately disproving the existence 
of either cogniser or cognition. The Sarvastivadin doctrine of 
momentariness, wherein things come into existence, remain for a 
moment, go into decay, and then cease, is countermanded by the per-
durance of memory. The Yogacara approach to vasana (residues of 
karma) is deemed inadequate due to its being based on the doctrines 
of impermanence and no-self. The final system critiqued by Mallisena 
is the Nastikas or Nihilists who proclaim nothing has meaning or pur­
poses. As a retort, the author notes that there is "purity of intelligence 
even on the part of one who has a body infected by leprosy",18 thus 
advancing an alternate, optimistic view of human potential. 
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In each of the instances mentioned above, Mallisena has clearly 
summarized the various schools examined. The critique he presents, 
while certainly not palatable from the perspective of those holding 
the respective views being discussed, holds true to Jainism's seven-
fold analysis of reality and rejection of extreme views. Each system is 
acknowledged as a partial truth and hence validated, though not 
applauded. 
The Jaina technique of rehearsing and then abrogating the 
"extreme" views of others, illustrated above in our cursory assess-
ment of non-Jaina systems, provides an interesting contrast with the 
Yogavasistha. The inclusivistic syncretism of Yogavasistha explicitly 
integrates teachings of Buddhist momentariness with Vedantin abso-
lutism. It attempts to combine the two extremes condemned by 
Mallisena into a single vision, although it lacks the systematic frame-
work such as the Jaina system of logic to accomplish this in a philo-
sophically coherent manner. Although the Hindu approach that 
advocates unifying multiplicity under the monistic umbrella has 
been referred to by Western scholars as inclusivism,19 no such equiv-
alent term occurs within the Yogavasistha tradition. The term inclu-
sivist might seem to indicate that the variant positions included are 
part of an overarching schematic, or answerable to some sort of cen-
tral deity or monistic absolute. I would argue that syncretic 
Hinduism seeks not so much to include divergent views but to force 
divergent views to accommodate themselves to the core Upanisadic 
monistic teachings on the identity of atman and brahman. 
Both monistic accommodationism and flexible fundamentalism 
illustrate that India has long grappled with an issue that has come to 
the forefront in the West during the last thirty years: given the plu-
rality of world religions that now come regularly into contact with 
one another, what hermeneutic approach is the most valid? Will the 
traditions more clearly define and maintain their integrity in light of 
their contact with other traditions? Will traditions begin to meld 
together, in the manner of late Hinduism absorbing aspects of 
Buddhism, to the point where a discrete Buddhism disappeared? 
The history of Christianity is replete with instances of both ten-
dencies: inward-looking fundamentalism and outwardly-influenced 
syncretism. On the one hand, the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon 
were fundamentalist responses to movements within the Christian 
community that were considered suspect: Arianism, monophysitism, 
Nestorianism, etc. The creeds aim to establish a clear, unambiguous 
definition as the foundation for Christian faith. Yet even the Gospels 
themselves are clearly the product of two cultural sensibilities joined 
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together, the Hebrew and the Hellenistic. Likewise, as with 
Augustine and then with Aquinas, the insights of other cultures have 
shaped and re-shaped the direction and orientation of Western 
Christianity. With Augustine we see an ascendance of personalistic, 
Neoplatonic, Manichaean religious forms; with Aquinas, thanks to 
the Islamic translations of Aristotle, we see yet another re-writing of 
the tradition. In each of these examples, the Christian faith seems 
less interested in maintaining fundamentals than in accommodating 
itself to new thought forms and issues. 
Since the advent of rationalism, European colonialism, the rise of 
the academic study of the world religions, and Vatican II, whole new 
revelations have been made accessible to the Christian world. As 
Thomas Berry has noted, the acknowledgment of and interest in 
world traditions potentially signals an infused vigor within the realm 
of theological discourse, unparalleled since the time of Thomas 
Aquinas. With this new development have arisen great debates over 
how best to proceed. In his book entitled No Other Name? A Critical 
Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions, published in 
1985, Paul Knitter offers a comprehensive survey of how various 
Christian denominations and thinkers have assessed this situation.20 
In some ways, this book, which describes itself as a textbook, is not 
unlike Mallisena's Syadvadamanjari and hence provides a similarly 
concise summary of a much larger body of literature. It surveys a 
host of positions, including the positions that all religions are rela-
tive (Troeltsch), that all are essentially the same (Toynbee), that all 
share a common psychic origin (Jung), that Christianity is the only 
true religion (Barth), that revelation is possible in other religions 
while salvation is not (Tillich), that all religions are ways of salvation 
(Rahner). Knitter's own contribution attempts a new synthesis, 
building on the theocentric model of Hick, Panikkar, and Samartha. 
Of the various models offered in Knitter's survey, the combined 
positions of Jung, Barth, and Tillich are closest to that of the Jainas. 
Like Jung, the Jainas see a commonality amongst jivas: all hold the 
potential for liberation (though some lack the ability to achieve it). 
Like Barth, the Jainas are convinced of the sole effectiveness of their 
own tradition in achieving their goal. Like Tillich, they agree that 
partial truth is found elsewhere as well. 
The solutions posed by Troeltsch, Toynbee, Rahner, and Knitter 
himself are more problematic from the Jaina perspective. Radical 
relativity would negate the efficacy of the Jaina system. Commonality 
of traditions (Toynbee) flies in the face of the perceived content of 
the respective traditions, as does the idea that all religions are ways 
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of salvation (Rahner). Ultimately, however, the most troublesome of 
these viewpoints from a Jaina perspective would be that of theocen-
trism, which, in the eyes of the Jainas, would remove the religious 
process from human control; the Jainas refute the notion of any 
external divine force and assert that all religious experiences 
rescind due to one's own initiative. 
In comparing the world view and method of contemporary ecu-
menists with that of the Jainas, there are both similarities and differ-
ences. Many ecumenists are searching for a unified truth, a basis for 
one's own belief that shares a ground of commonality with the reli-
gious life of others. For the Jainas, this quest for common ground is 
not the case. The Jainas are firm in their own belief structure: their 
cosmology, logic, and ethics have remained unaltered for nearly 
three thousand years and, as we have seen, Jainism clearly distin-
guishes itself from other traditions. In a sense, Jaina fundamentals 
are unshakable. However, accompanying this certitude is a driving 
concern to understand the beliefs of others, not to change them-
selves or even necessarily to convert others. 
The work of contemporary Christian ecumenists, on the other 
hand, is often exploratory, creative, synthetic, and sometimes syn-
cretic. However, this adventurousness carries with it the possibility of 
losing or altering one's own truths. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr has 
pointed out: 
Although based often on the positive intention of creating better 
understanding of other religions, most of the proponents of ecu-
menism place mutual understanding above the total integrity of a 
tradition to the extent that there are now those Christian theologians 
who claim that Christians should stop believing in the incarnation in 
order to understand Muslims and have Muslims understand them. 
One could only ask why they should remain Christians and not 
embrace Islam altogether.21 
This is the inevitable conundrum of holding a logical system that 
seeks truth in monolithic terms. Nasr himself clearly and self-admit-
tedly operates out of a commitment to esoteric experience that 
assents to the Vedantic and Islamic Sufi vision of oneness; in his per-
spective, all religions are seen through this prism. However, like the 
Jainas (and unlike some ecumenists), Nasr defends holding strongly 
to one's own perspective while simultaneously advocating the explo-
ration of other expressions of truth: 
The criticism that can be made against the religious exclusivists is not 
that they have strong faith in their religion. They possess faith but 
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they lack principal knowledge, that kind of knowledge which can 
penetrate into foreign universes of form and bring out their inner 
meanings.22 
In this instance, a more sympathetic eye is cast on the foundations 
of other traditions than has been evidenced by the Jainas. 
Another approach, similar to the quest for commonality, has been 
suggested by Leonard Swidler. Unlike Nasr's emphasis on the divine 
or sacred as fundamental, Swidler offers an architectonic, "universal 
theology" that, as its ethos, allows "full human life" and "ultimate 
meaning."23 However, just as Nasr's solution may sound odd to the 
non-theistic ears of a Jaina, so Swidler's appeal to a higher human-
ism might offend a Muslim because of its avoidance of God-lan-
guage. 
In this brief survey of interreligious encounters, three potential 
outcomes can be discerned: conversion; accommodationist syn-
cretism, often in the form of a monistic, super-inclusivistic metathe-
ology; and renewed or tolerant or flexible fundamentalism. 
Conversion is one very real option: undoubtedly, some ecu-
menists have been converted unconsciously or in spite of themselves 
and would protest such a label. As Ewert Cousins has commented, 
one of the greatest challenges facing Christians who have had a gen-
uine experience of Islam is to be able to return to the Christian 
Trinitarian tradition: the monotheism of the Islamic faith is very 
compelling and convincing. The emphasis on inferiority found with-
in south and east Asian traditions also has been very attractive and 
effective for many. 
Accommodationist syncretion has been a long-standing practice 
throughout Asia, with the interpénétration of Taoism, Buddhism, 
and Confucianism in China, Korea, and Japan, and the successive 
religious adaptations made in India when the Sramanic and Vedic 
traditions merged, when Sankara infused Hinduism with Buddhism, 
when Guru Nanak brought Islam and Hindu ideas together, when 
Akbar formulated and instituted his Divine Wisdom religion, when 
Ram Mohan Roy began to integrate the Christian gospels with all of 
the above, and when Swami Vivekananda brought neo-Vedanta to 
the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. Within the 
last decade, the New Age movement has introduced shamanic tech-
niques into the melange. One difficulty with a "tradition" of this sort 
(and this is meant to also include inclusive ideologies such as benev-
olent humanism), is that the rigorous study and logical consistency 
that characterizes the "great traditions" becomes tenuous, though, 
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as Raimundo Panikkar has pointed out, these matters should not be 
the litmus test for spiritual experience: "a rationality does not 
exhaustively define the human being."24 
Renewed or tolerant or flexible fundamentalism, preferred by the 
Jainas, allows and, in fact, requires that the religiously informed per-
son be well acqua in ted with how different t rad i t ions have 
approached the basic issues of human limitation and transcen-
dence. It encourages respect for others' perspectives and yet allows 
one's primary commitment to remain rooted in that with which one 
feels most authenticated. It combines both perspectivalism and 
apologetics, as advocated by Paul Griffiths.25 
Fundamentalism is often viewed disparagingly as a blind devotion 
to a fixed set of beliefs to the point of excluding all other views. 
However, in order for a religious tradition to perform effectively, 
certain world views need to be agreed upon by its adherents; under-
standably these at times come into conflict. The Jaina solution to 
this dilemma is found in a logical structure that allows for and 
respects myriad positions yet holds to its own cosmological and ethi-
cal view. Jaina beliefs and precepts have not changed in over two 
and a half millennia, and yet Jainism survives with vigor in modern, 
industrial India. As various forms of Christianity, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Islam enter into dialogue with their own multiple 
forms and with one another, new structures are needed to identify 
what beliefs are essential and central to one's own subtradition and 
tradition and how these may best be articulated and then related to 
the traditions of others. The Jaina model of flexible fundamentalism 
offers one option for validating a fundamentalist devotion to basic 
teachings while still acknowledging the validity of divergent views 
within their own context. 
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